Taxation of Image Rights

Taxation of Image Rights: Remarks in Light of the Cristiano Ronaldo Case and Recent Amendments to the Italian Income Tax Code

In this note, the author analyses the complex Italian tax framework governing income from the exploitation of image rights by athletes and celebrities. After outlining the main interpretative approaches that have emerged over time, it focuses on the landmark case involving Portuguese footballer Cristiano Ronaldo during his tenure at Juventus football club. The discussion concludes with an assessment of the recent amendments to the Italian Consolidated Income Tax Act and their potential impact on the taxation of image rights in the sports and entertainment industries.

1. Taxation of Image Rights in Italy: An Overview

The regulation of image rights is not found in a specific place in the Italian Consolidated Income Tax Act (Testo Unico delle Imposte sui Redditi, TUIR).¹ The tax literature, administrative practice of the Italian Revenue Agency (Agenzia delle Entrate) and domestic case law have long debated the proper income classification applicable to remuneration deriving from the exploitation of the image rights of athletes and artists (and, more recently, content creators and influencers). This issue takes on particular significance in respect of foreign athletes and artists when the ultimate aim is to determine whether income arising from the exploitation of their image rights is to be considered of an Italian or foreign source.

Within this preliminary framework of uncertainty, two key developments have emerged: first, the ruling in the well-known Cristiano Ronaldo case² and, second, the amendments to the TUIR introduced by Legislative Decree 192 of 13 December 2024.³

In order to properly assess the impact these two developments - one judicial and the other legislative - have had on the Italian tax system, it is necessary to begin by analysing the regulatory and interpretative landscape that existed prior to these occurrences.

In the following sections, therefore, before analysing the decision in the Cristiano Ronaldo case (section 4.) and the recent legislative amendments to the TUIR concern- ing the taxation of image rights (section 5.), the authors examine the prevailing theories regarding income qualification (section 2.) and the territorial allocation of image rights (section 3.), which, up to 2023, posed significant interpretive challenges for both Italian legal scholar- ship and the tax authorities' administrative practice. The author's conclusions are given in section 6.

2. Classification of Image Rights Income

Until 2023-2024, the prevailing view in Italy was that, for income tax purposes, remuneration derived from the exploitation of image rights was to be classified under one of only three of the six categories of income identified by article 6 of the TUIR:⁴ 

• employment income;
• self-employment income; or
• miscellaneous income (redditi diversi).

The general view was that remuneration from image rights should fall within the employment income category only when the right to exploit the image had been incorporated into an employment contract. Only in such scenarios would the image right be "absorbed" into the category of employment income.

The most frequently cited example has always been that of football players.

It was and still is common, during negotiations for a professional contract with a football club, for the club to request the right to commercially exploit the athlete's image. If the player agrees, the club will then manage two "assets": the player's sporting performance and their image. The athlete's remuneration then has two components: (i) athletic performance and (ii) the exploitation of image rights.

Although consisting of distinct elements, this remuneration constitutes a single payment, which, in its entirety, is treated as the player's employment income. This conclusion is rooted in the Italian principle of "comprehensive inclusion" (principio di onnicomprensività) applicable to employment income, pursuant to which: "[e]mployment income consists of all amounts and benefits of any kind, received in the tax period for any reason whatsoever, including donations, in relation to the employment relationship”. In essence, under this principle, all income connected to the employment relationship is to be classified as employment income regardless of the specific nature of the activity generating the remuneration.

With regard to self-employment income, however, the classification process becomes significantly more complex. Until 2023-2024, two competing theories coexisted in Italy.

The first, more traditional, theory⁵ - closely tied to a literal interpretation of articles 53 and 54(1-quater) of the TUIR⁶ - was that, in order for income derived from image rights to qualify as self-employment income, it must first be established that an activity that generates self-employment income already exists.

In summary, this theory provides that self-employment income presupposes the exercise of an activity characterized by regularity, professionalism and autonomy. Such an activity cannot be found to exist based on the mere execution of image rights contracts, as these contracts do not pertain to any activity. In self-employment, services or performances are offered, whereas the assignment of image rights concerns an intangible asset - the image itself - which does not, in itself, require any specific activity. If the image rights agreement is separate from that of the athletic performance contract, it cannot automatically be considered as related to the performance. If the athlete's performance is carried out under a self-employment contract, it may be possible to apply article 54(1-quater) of the TUIR and thus include the income from image rights in the tax base. Since athletic performance is, however, generally rendered under an employment contract, there is no self-employment activity to justify the application of article 54(1-quater). This provision does not serve to classify income, but merely to quantify it. Therefore, a qualify- ing self-employment activity must exist in the first place in order for this rule to apply. The mere assignment of image rights is not sufficient to justify qualification; only when there is an underlying self-employment activity can article 54(1-quater) be invoked.

The second theory, by contrast, is grounded in a different assumption: it considers article 54(1-quater) of the TUIR to serve the purpose of qualifying income rather than quantifying it.

According to proponents of this theory:⁷

(…) it should be noted, more generally, that [Article 54(1-quater) of the TUIR] (…) does not appear to have been appropriately placed within Chapter V of the TUIR, which governs self-employment income. Since it essentially serves a qualificatory function – effectively expanding the scope of professional self-employment income - it would have been more appropriate for it to be included in Article 53(1), rather than Article 54, which concerns the ‘determination of self-employment income’. [author’s translation]

Under this theory, therefore, in order to include income from image rights within the scope of article 53(1) of the TUIR as self-employment income, it should not be necessary to first determine that there is a self-employment activity to which the image-related income would attach. Rather, the exploitation of image rights, in and of itself, should be deemed capable of generating self-employment income.

The final income category applicable to image rights is that of miscellaneous income. This is a residual category that, in principle, includes all income that, either by its nature or by way of a legislative designation, does not qualify as income from land, capital, employment, or business.

The classification of image-related income as miscellaneous income, until 2023, depended largely on which of the two self-employment theories one subscribed to. By adopting the first theory (which requires a qualifying self-employment activity to be present), income from image rights would be classified as miscellaneous only in situations in which the exploitation of the image was not granted as part of negotiations with the employer. In this scenario, if income from image rights could not independently qualify as self-employment income (as per the theory’s criteria), it would necessarily fall into the residual category of miscellaneous income.

Conversely, adopting the second theory (which considers the mere act of exploiting one’s image to be sufficient in order to generate self-employment income), the scenarios in which image income would be classified as miscellaneous are broader. It would be enough for the image exploitation activity to lack the regularity and professionalism that define self-employment for such income to be reclassified under article 67(1)(l) of the TUIR, which states: 

“Miscellaneous income includes (…) income derived from self-employment activities not carried out on a regular basis or from the undertaking of obligations to do, refrain from doing, or allow something”. [author’s translation]

The theories outlined above – albeit briefly – represent the main interpretive approaches developed by Italian legal scholarship and administrative practice up to around the end of 2023 on the classification of income derived from image rights. The next step, then, is to assess how these theories affect the issue of territoriality, particularly when the artist or athlete receiving sponsorship income is a non-resident taxpayer.

The theories outlined above – albeit briefly – represent the main interpretive approaches developed by Italian legal scholarship and administrative practice up to around the end of 2023 on the classification of income derived from image rights. The next step, then, is to assess how these theories affect the issue of territoriality, particularly when the artist or athlete receiving sponsorship income is a non-resident taxpayer.

3. Territoriality of Image Rights

When can income derived from image rights, received by a non-resident athlete or artist, be considered Italian sourced? This is the question the author aims to answer through the application of the nexus criteria set forth in article 23 of the TUIR.

1. IT: Income Tax Consolidation Act, Presidential Decree No. 917/1986 [Testo Unico delle Imposte sui Redditi, TUIR], accessed 18 Aug. 2025, https:// www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/1986/12/31/302/so/126/sg/pdf.
2. Regional Tax Court of Second Instance of Piedmont (Corte di Giustizia tributaria di II grado del Piemonte), 15 May 2023, Decision 219.
3. IT: Legislative Decree No. 192 of 13 Dec. 2024.
4. See Davide Greco and Maria Lucia Di Tanna, Aspetti legali e fiscali dell’influencer marketing (Maggioli, 2023).
5. This interpretive theory can be traced back to Professor Andrea Carinci of the University of Bologna. See, in particular, his article entitled “Lo sfruttamento del diritto di immagine: un percorso tortuoso ancora da costruire”, Rivista di diritto finanziario e scienze delle finanze, no. 2 (2022).
6. In the version in force at the time
7. This theory may be attributed to Paolo Scarioni and Antonio Fiorentino Martino, as developed in their article “Compensi degli sportivi per la cessione del diritto di sfruttamento dell’immagine”, Corriere tributario, no. 10 (2022).
8. No longer applicable under the current law.